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The year 2013 marked the 50th anniversary of the publication of the complete Systematic 
Theology, a massive attempt to present in a rational fashion the core of Christian beliefs, myths, 
and rites in a manner that speaks to its time—a time of profound unbelief and anxiety. As 
theologian, Tillich feels no lack of warrant, for theology speaks only of things that are of 
ultimate concern to humans, things that unavoidably interest us because they are a matter of our 
very being or nonbeing (Tillich 1967, 1: 14, 16).1 Our experience of being in modern times is 
one of anxiety, a perceived background  of meaninglessness that drives us into collectivism or 
conformism, or individualism, or despair and deprives us of authentic forms of courage—the 
ability to confront our finitude, the wormhole of nonbeing in the ontological apple. “Anxiety is 
finitude, experienced as one’s own finitude” (Tillich 2000, 35). What is Christian in Tillich’s 
theology is its tie to historical Christianity and to the normative expression of early Christians 
that in Jesus God manifested the Logos or messiah. Tillich’s Christology is not our concern here, 
nor is the adequacy of his work as a theologian charged with preserving the continuity of 
Christian doctrine. He comes at things from the other end, examining the whole of contemporary 
cultural experience to see whether or in what ways religion’s message can still be part of such a 
world and counteract its secular practice of distraction or despair. He displays wide learning, 
remarkable intellectual honesty, and keen insight into the demands of his time—on a par with 
that of the other great expatriate religious and philosophical thinkers who fled Nazi aggression: 
Simone Weil, Ernst Cassirer, and Hannah Arendt.2 He is an exquisite practitioner of the history 
of ideas, at once able to encode whole eras in generalizations which are apt and pithy and to 
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characterize individual thinkers with remarkable brevity. Our central concern in this paper is to 
elucidate how Tillich makes religion a matter of ontology, and how, throughout his career, he 
follows Schelling’s model of ontological questioning—which I will here call the double-helix, or 
the twisted structure of being and nonbeing, which results in an expanse of being that is unable to 
be in any other way than dynamic or shifting, and therefore ambiguous. 
 
In the paper’s first section I shall briefly discuss Tillich early Schelling studies and then turn to 
Schelling’s own texts to show that Tillich interpretation is correct. The major part of the paper 
will be devoted to showing how Schelling’s concepts form the structural backbone of Systematic 
Theology as well as the more accessible Courage to Be lectures where Tillich argues that the 
only credible form of religious belief is an absolute one where Christianity criticizes its concrete 
symbols and embraces a God beyond theism (Tillich 2000, 188-89). While the language of the 
lectures is more daring, its content is no more disquieting to the professional theologian than the 
view presented in the final volume of Systematic Theology of the ambiguous presence of the 
Spirit in a spiritual community that across history may or may not dwell in those ecclesial 
structures that call themselves Christ’s church. The frail flame of ‘unambiguous life’ that is 
sheltered by spiritual community is fragmentary and anticipatory, at best, and lacks specifically 
religious teachings, symbols or acts (Tillich 1967, 3:157-58). Tillich’s religion, like Schelling’s, 
is ontological, not ecclesial. While its truth is available to any who will reflect on the human 
condition and the limitations of humankind’s capacity to comprehend and reshape itself, it may 
seem discontinuous with earlier forms of Christianity’s self-expression and put off those who 
have found meaning or experienced solace in those poetic or symbolic forms. And the 
contemporary culture of speed, results, and amusement hardly favors reflection and the leisure 
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that, etymologically at least, is the life of the scholar or questioner. In both case, the preference 
for an aesthetic existence overcomes the attraction of truth.3 
 
 
I. 
Tillich’s knowledge of Schelling is deep and sympathetic from the very first. In his philosophical 
dissertation of 1910, The Construction of the History of Religion in Schelling’s Positive 
Philosophy, the young Tillich attempts a sweeping interpretation of Schelling’s long journey to 
the philosophical religion of the late writings, but gravitates toward the philosophy of freedom of 
the 1809 Philosophical Investigations.  The essence of human consciousness is God-positing, an 
intellectual intuition of the identity between finite and absolute consciousness (Tillich 1974a, 
122), but at the same time it is estranged from its God-positing substantiality. Tillich agrees with 
Schelling that essence of the religious picture is that “the formulation of a concept of religion 
must necessarily include a relationship between God and man that presupposes a definite 
division between them” (ibid., 124). The tension between identity and action in the human spirit 
that is the driving motive in Schelling’s early philosophical development becomes in the 1809 
essay a historical process, a path of development in which the repose of intellectual intuition is 
sundered when the subject becomes agent.4  Finite consciousness posits itself as fallen from the 
identity of its original God positing, but not as the so-called natural religion of Enlightenment 
times might picture it: in independence from a rational world-architect and serenely possessing 
as its own its limited faculties of reason, imagination, and will. That human consciousness is 
God-positing and at the same time self-separated from the divine is the core of Tillich’s view of 
human reality (ibid., 125-27).  There is a struggle at the core of the religious relationship, which 
4 
 
in its most explicit form is the “guilt-accepting acceptance of unacceptability,” viewed in The 
Courage to Be as Martin Luther’s personal or existential experience of Christian grace. In that 
experience, one comprehends God as the ontological Yes that includes its No, and blessedness is 
experienced as both bliss and the nameless anxiety it conquers (Tillich 2000, 180). 
 
Tillich’s 1912 theological dissertation, Mysticism and Guilt-consciousness in Schelling’s  
Philosophical Development, identifies the core of all of Schelling’s thought in the tension 
between the identity of God and the finite and the ‘fall’ (self-separation) of the later—or the 
otherness of existence, signified by the failure of the ontological proof (Tillich 1974b, 35). While 
one might want to frame Schelling’s philosophical development in terms of the influence of 
other philosophers—as if in addition to the philosophy of nature there are periods where Plato, 
Spinoza, Boehme, Baader, Hegel, and finally Aristotle provide inspiration—Tillich claims there 
is really only one theme connecting his many works: the identity principle and its relation to 
moral categories such as separation, fall, and freedom. Tillich prefers the clarity of the 1809 
Philosophical Investigations to the detail of the positive philosophy (ibid. 22-25), the discussion 
of Schelling’s text that offered in this early work is quite condensed and cryptic. Early essays on  
Fichtean themes, the various versions of Naturphilosophie and the aesthetics of genius that 
crown the System of Transcendental Idealism are each read as a variant of identity theory: ethical 
mysticism, nature mysticism, aesthetic mysticism (ibid., 45-68). Philosophy and Religion (1804) 
marks a turn toward history, and with the teaching of the self-separation or fall of the ideas into 
finite existence the ‘mysticism’ (identity) of intellectual intuition is breached. Tillich’s exegesis 
of the 1809 freedom essay takes the logic of the previous identity theory in a distinctly 
theological direction; contradiction and self-will are read as ‘sin’ and ‘guilt’, and the cosmic 
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process of separating good and evil is read as the triumph of ‘grace’ over ‘death and wrath’ 
(ibid., 108-112). But in phrases such as “the identity of sin and grace,” Tillich thinks in solidarity 
with Schelling that evil and the self-will which is its origin remain even in their cosmic 
resolution. Guilt has its ground in ontology, as Tillich major works assert, and is no more a 
psychological quirk than the background radiation of anxiety that is its horizon and cradle. 
 
II. 
Tillich’s theology follows Schelling’s philosophy in its insistence that religious questions are 
ontological, that ontology is a dynamic domain, not an assemblage of things manufactured or 
arbitrarily brought together. The logos of being follows from the question first posed by Leibniz, 
Why is there is something and not nothing? In its first and highest instance, being is self-
realizing, that is, it includes the possibility of nonbeing while it indeed stands out from nonbeing. 
 
Tillich opens Systematic Theology with an essay on reason and revelation. In its asking of the 
first and ultimate questions, reason is driven beyond itself to ‘mystery’, the ground or abyss that 
precedes reason. It is of ultimate concern for us because it is about the ground of our being, and 
it is ‘ecstatic’ because it reaches beyond the subject-object structure for that which is primal.  
And it involves, says Tillich, an “ontological” or metaphysical shock in that it involves Why not 
nothing?, which carries with it a realization that I or anybody might well not be here to ask the 
question (Tillich 1967, 1: 110-113). There is something disquieting about the answers such a 
question can receive, for they are irretrievably symbolic or metaphorical. If one says “the divine 
life is a dynamic unity of depth and form,” and goes on to explain that by “depth” one means the 
abysmal character of God, the ineffability and inexhaustibility of being itself, by ‘form” one 
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means word, logic or structure, and by “dynamic unity” a process of unforeseeable 
communication or unfolding, it is obvious that these are neither logical nor personal categories 
(ibid 1: 156, cp. 115). Tillich takes both this ontological starting point and the terms for 
describing the three-dimensional life of God from Schelling 
 
First, let us look to Schelling’s concept of ontology. When Schelling publically inaugurated the 
Positive Philosophy in 1841/42 with the Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Revelation, he 
insisted that the difference between concept and existence (or possibility and actuality) is 
unbridgeable, that the finite being of the potencies follows from the unforeseeable existence of 
the absolute Prius. In turning to this hyper-conceptual idea of actuality, he deepens and refines 
two earlier veins of ontological exploration (Schelling 1977, 160-64). The first (explored in the 
writings of 1795-1800) is the relatively simple concept of God or the absolute as self-existent. 
The second (explored in the writings of 1801-1815) is the concept of God or the absolute as free 
over against being, or having an actuality that somehow dialectically combined being and 
nonbeing, or envisioned existence as involving a power that asserted being over nonbeing. The 
first line of thought yields a pure essence, the concept of necessary existence whose ontological 
status is necessary but contingent—a necessary existent, if it exists. The actus purus of the 
second line of thought makes the divine being contingently necessary, relative to the possibility 
for other-being that it establishes (ibid., 165-171). In a third aspect, positive philosophy 
stipulates that God is spirit or freedom over against primordial being and realized possibility, an 
evolution of that which ought to be (ibid., 172-76). This complicated line of thought 
fundamentally pits the concept of necessary existence against freedom to be or not to be.   
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Schelling always showed an interest in the ontological proof, although he was as skeptical as 
Kant about whether it ‘worked’.  In 1795, he argued that in the realm of proof we are always 
dealing with conditions; the divine being, however, ought to be a matter of rational analysis, 
hence unconditioned. When we do ascribe being to the absolute, we should not confuse being 
with contingent existence or actuality (Schelling 1856-61, 1: 308, 308n).5 In 1802, Schelling 
uses the analog of the ontological proof to explain the certainty of intellectual intuition; from the 
very idea of an absolute cognition that one has, one can infer the reality of an absolute wherein 
form (knowing) and being are the same. What is deficient in the so-called proof is the way it 
pictures its object as somehow subsisting outside of its actuality-- its cognizing and being-
cognized (Schelling 1856-61, 4: 363-68).  In 1804 Schelling repeats and amplifies this argument, 
moving from the self-intuition of reason in intellectual intuition to the conclusion that what is 
realized in reason is the idea of God. The idea of God is self-realizing in reason—the form of 
cognition that is self-identical and beyond the all the difference that inhabits discursive knowing 
(Schelling 1856-61, 6: 150-54). The idea of God, which is self-enjoyed in intellectual intuition, 
illuminates the ‘why’ of God’s being, i.e., it is modally necessary, not factual, and so forever 
beyond the reach of nonbeing. Nothing or utter nonbeing is impossible.  Says Schelling, 
 
The absolute light: the idea of God, strikes reason like a flash of lightning, so to speak, 
and its luminosity endures in reason as an eternal affirmation of knowledge.  By virtue of 
this affirmation which is the essence of our soul, we recognize the eternal impossibility of 
nonbeing that can never be known or comprehended; and that ultimate question posed by 
vertiginous intellect hovering at the abyss of the infinite: ‘Why is there something rather 
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than nothing?’, this question will be swept aside forever by the necessity of being, that is, 
by the absolute affirmation of being in knowledge (ibid., 155). 
 
For Tillich’s purposes, though not ultimately for Schelling’s, this dynamic being that both 
incorporates and excludes nonbeing suffices to get the project of systematic theology underway. 
God is the affirmation of being, and if being is, as Spinoza realized, power or the self-expression 
of what is essential, the human finds her essential being expressed in the religious relationship. 
Another way to say this is to say that because the divine-human relationship is at the core of the 
human being, her fundamental problem (finitude) and her awareness of it (anxiety) pertain to that 
relationship to too (Tillich 2000, 24-28). If modern man experiences life as precarious and his 
self-awareness is anxiety, anxiety is a religious experience. 
 
Tillich chooses to follow Schelling in calling the primordial or ontological aspect of God “the 
Abyss.” It is the ground of reality, human and natural; it is ineffable or inconceivable, self-
enclosed and manifests itself only as power of resisting nonbeing. The only thing literal or 
nonsymbolic that one can say of God is that it is being itself, neither a being nor the totality of 
being. Various theologies have tried to apply categories of relation to the God-human 
relationship, but it is only symbolic or non-literal speech if we speak of God as the creator or 
immanent cause  (Tillich 1967, 1: 236-38). All ontological speech is symbolic or analogous—
except to say that something is and cannot not be. Ever careful with his words, Tillich notes that 
“it is as atheistic to affirm the existence of God as to deny it. God is being itself, not a being” 
(ibid., 237). About symbolic speech, he thinks a symbol speaks ‘truly’ if it reveals something or 
9 
 
speaks to somebody. But the history of religions is filled with dead symbols, or ways of speaking 
of the finite-infinite relation that fail to reflect light in both directions. 
 
Tillich adopts a mode of Trinitarian thinking from Schelling that is ontological, prior to any 
discussion of Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Human intuition has always distinguished the 
element of power in the divine from the element of meaning, the logos or word, and then gone on 
to distinguish a third principle of communication or expression whereby the finite and the 
infinite are united, spirit (ibid., 1, 250-251).  Schelling displays this Trinitarian way of thinking 
as early as the Bruno, where the three potencies of identity theory are rescued from the dry 
Spinozism of Presentation of My System and put into Neoplatonic and mythic guise, wherein the 
finite individuals in their apostasy from their organic life in the ideas are seem to be products of 
self-will or self-temporization (Schelling 1856-61, 4: 283-84). The identity of all or the eternal 
potency is compared to the Father, the infinite or ideal potency to the Spirit which unifies, while 
the finite power is by its own will made subject to time and becomes a suffering god (ibid., 252).  
Trinitarian thinking is found in the 1809 Philosophical Investigations as well, with one of the 
triadic structures (nature, man, and a personal God) used to secure the philosophical account of 
the possibility of evil and another (Ungrund, nature and spirit) used to explain the dynamics of 
being or the cosmic process of development (Schelling 2006, 62-63, 69-70).  
 
III. 
Let us turn to a closer look at Tillich’s theology. Generally, we follow the text of Systematic 
Theology for discussions of theological and philosophical method. The contemporary look back 
at the interface of religion and other forms of culture cannot help but be historical---and critical. 
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For insight into Tillich’s thought about the current state of Christian theology and the possibility 
of its relevance to the human situation in the age of anxiety, when much of Christian writings, 
rites, and morality are seen to be worn out and lacking in the power to guide, we look to the more 
homiletic Courage to Be lectures. 
 
Systematic theology operates by what Tillich calls the “the method of correlation.” Questions 
that are philosophical, or really anthropological, receive theological answers, for religion 
functions as one of the chief repositories of answers about existence that the question-posing 
animal requires. “Man is the question he asks about himself, before any question has been 
formulated” (Tillich 1967,1: 62).  The method of correlation explains the content of the Christian 
faith through the interdependence of existential questions and theological answers (ibid., 60-61). 
A coherentist epistemology is at work here. No inherently true human experiences, miraculous 
sightings or inerrant writings can be found to validate or invalidate a religious worldview—
something that is essentially philosophical (or undecidable)!  “Revelation does not destroy 
reason, but reason raises the question of revelation” (ibid., 81).   
 
The Schelling of the 1809 Philosophical Investigations shares with both his major 20th century 
disciples, Heidegger and Tillich, the conviction that questions about God and world occur in 
humankind because man is the site of both questioning and self-awareness. Whether or not such 
questions are answerable, or resolvable through analysis or action, questioning is the human 
activity par excellence. Tillich remains optimistic about the availability of answers: “Man is able 
to answer the ontological question himself because he experiences directly and immediate the 
structure of being and its elements” (ibid., 169). As embodied finite reason, the human 
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experiences being as limited power, existence as self-contradictory, and the life process itself as 
ambiguous (ibid., 81).  But as subject or self-aware, the human directly experiences being, 
existence, and life and so has a pre-reflective comprehension of those dimensions of the divine 
that Christian revelation speaks of as the ground of being, the possibility of new existence, and 
the life of spirit. When the abysmal ground manifests the logos, existence is seen to be not 
essentially guilt but ‘new being’ and the social and historical dimension of life, with all of its 
heartbreak and frailty, is seen to promise the seeds of ‘unambiguous life’ (Tillich 1967, 2: 176-
77; 3: 401-402, 420-422). 
 
In its first appearance, says Tillich, the ontological question considers the one who poses the 
question; self and world are presumed, tied together in subject-object structure. Secondly, the 
question concerns the “elements” that make up the structure of being; thirdly, the difference 
between essential being and existence, and finally, it involves the categories of being and 
knowing (Tillich 1976, 1: 164). It is the second consideration that offers the richest field for 
comment, the vaguely named ontological elements, which come in three contrasting pairs: 
 
Individuality – Universality 
     Dynamics – Form 
     Freedom – Destiny 
 
All three concern human agency and its environment. The first pair considers the individual or 
person as the unit of human reality. Though singular in number, by possessing mind, the 
individual human is connected to others physically and temporally remote. ‘Communion’ or 
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community is participation in one or more similarly individuated or self-centered selves, and is 
essential to the life of the individual (ibid., 176). Quantification across this dimension yields an 
important measure of how persons experience themselves and their world: the contrast between 
individualism and collectivism. Courage to Be uses this measure to distinguish not only political 
styles of existence, e.g., liberalism vis-à-vis totalitarianism, but to contrast styles of Christian 
conscience, e.g., Protestant individualism and Catholic or medieval quasi-collectivism (Tillich 
200, 101-117). Tillich avoids the stereotypical contrast between Protestantism’s freedom of 
conscience and Catholic authoritarianism, for factors other than religion and individual choice 
lessen the contrast between individualism and collectivism. Participating in economic 
production, for example, enforces a quotidian conformism in ‘free’ societies which makes daily 
life similar to that in centrally planned economies. The second pair is somewhat oddly named, 
for ‘dynamics’ indicates that which is unformed, but endowed with potential, or something 
relatively irrational in contrast to precise rationality. The tension between dynamics and form 
indicates a creative way of simultaneously conserving and transcending oneself, or of preserving 
oneself while transforming self and environing conditions—like the equilibrium of a physical 
system or the homeostasis of an organism (Tillich 2000, 1: 174-76). Finally, the tension between 
freedom and destiny indicate the nature of a situated act by a free agent, one that necessarily 
takes place in a physical context and in a definite matrix of possibilities. “Freedom is 
experienced as deliberation, decision, and responsibility” (ibid., 184). That my act is situated 
means that destiny informs my freedom; that I have to weigh values and choose among 
competing alternatives means that my freedom participates in shaping my destiny. 
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These three structures of being together indicate the parameters of human existence that an 
individual person enacts—the social, biological and mental conditions of finite human freedom. 
While they give Tillich the tools for much of the critical or destructive work of Systematic 
Theology-- which is an encyclopedic review of the major epistemological, scientific, 
philosophical, political, psychological, social and religious ideas of our civilization-- they also 
give him the categories for positively elaborating the Christian ethic that is found in the Courage 
to Be lectures.   
 
The ontological situation for the post-modern human is continuous anxiety, accompanied by a 
pervasive guilt. Anxiety is object-less fear, fear that persists when fear is the only thing to fear.  
Guilt is the appropriate response. In earlier times, Western man required pictures and stories of 
places of punishment and torture by fantastic beasts and malevolent beings. Now the most 
ordinary human beings in the most secure places imagine themselves objects of surveillance; 
everyman is Kafka’s Joseph K.—or Edward Snowden. The human response is courage, 
ontological rather than soldierly courage, and the various styles of human existence—
individualism, conformism, and collectivism—determine corresponding styles of courage to be.   
 
Anxiety is an ontological malady, the awareness of our own finitude or of the fact that we carry 
nonbeing in our very ontic self-expression. There is anxiety in every fear, and vice versa. The 
fear of death lurks behind the fear in every anxiety, but close inspection reveals that the human is 
anxious about being itself. “The basic anxiety, the anxiety of a finite being about the threat of 
nonbeing, cannot be eliminated. It belongs to being itself” (Tillich 2000, 39). Tillich elaborates 
three styles or potencies of anxiety: 1) the anxiety of unpredictability (fate) and death, 2) the 
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anxiety of emptiness and meaninglessness, and 3) and the anxiety of despair. Uncertainty and 
lack of control prefigure death, the poverty of the outcome of one’s work portends 
meaninglessness, but the upshot of all our acts, from their moral foundations to their spiritual 
satisfaction, seems to crumble into dust and leave only a vague residue of guilt. Everything in 
human life points to despair, except for the petty distractions and evasions which for the most 
part keep us comfortably numb (ibid., 40-56). 
 
In response to this map of the labyrinth of despair, Tillich offers a slim thread twisted from the 
varieties of courageous response. The basic binary is to rely upon oneself or to take refuge in the 
collective. Self-reliance undergirds the romantic, naturalistic, and demonic forms of 
individualism seen in recent cultural history, and paves the way for the lonely encounter of the 
resolute person in absolute anxiety (ibid., 148-49). The collectivistic alternative opts for the path 
of participation and becomes mysticism. The mystic is willing to turn ontology inside out and so 
finds rest in that her doubt is turned against finite being and negates it, since everything that 
appears is deceptive and illusory. “Nonbeing is no threat because finite being is, in the last 
analysis, nonbeing. . . .  The anxiety of meaninglessness is conquered where the ultimate 
meaning is not something definite but the abyss of every definite meaning” (ibid., 158-59). 
Tillich has limited confidence in the mystic solution, although every individualistic kind of 
ontological courage involves an element of trusting in the abyss, or the power of being to 
overcome nonbeing. 
 
Since religion gives answers to questions that philosophy poses, it must be the elemental 
character of the human situation in which the definitive answer to anxiety can be found. So 
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Tillich looks again to the individual-or-participant structure of the person’s selfhood and finds 
that in the middle between mystic absorption into the ground and personal encounter with a so-
called ‘divine person’ one finds faith (ibid., 156-57). Absolute faith—perhaps naked faith might 
be the better term—does not deny or transcend meaninglessness as mysticism does, but embraces 
it, at least within a skeptical moment of action. The skeptical element cuts against the subject-
object structure of personal encounter, so that the modern existentialist hero seems to encounter 
meaninglessness in its purest or grittiest form (ibid., 177-78). It almost goes without saying that 
the skeptical element, so exercised, will also sweep away almost all the forms, formulas, and 
rituals of prior versions of Christianity. Though Tillich speaks more reticently (or professionally) 
in Systematic Theology, there is little asserted in its third volume about the Spirit, the 
community, and the ‘kingdom of God’ in history that is edifying or consoling. The presence of 
the Spirit in a spiritual community that may or may not have much to do with the churches and 
their muddled histories is everywhere ambiguous, even if spirit is defined as ‘unambiguous life’ 
(Tillich 1967, 3: 183ff). As representing the kingdom of God and embodying the spiritual 
community, the churches both reveal and hide (ibid., 375).  
 
Absolute faith is empty faith, or to say the same thing, ontological faith—trusting in the power of 
being--which always has to be glossed as the expansion or assertion of being over the contraction 
of nonbeing. Nonbeing is the element in being which constrains being, which by enclosing its 
power within limits, forces it to be beyond itself and to open itself as power and love. Speaking 
in almost as oracular as fashion as Schelling does in the Philosophical Investigations, Tillich 
states, 
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Nonbeing (that in God which makes his self-affirmation dynamic) opens up the divine 
self-seclusion and reveals him as power and love. Nonbeing makes God a living God. 
Without the No he has to overcome in himself and in his creatures, the divine Yes to 
himself would be lifeless. There would be no revelation of the ground of being, there 
would be no life (Tillich 2000, 180).   
 
What of the ‘believer’ (or absolute skeptic, rather) in the situation of absolute faith? The horizon 
of meaningless is not expunged; guilt is not assuaged, for there is no Kantian court of reason to 
indict or to acquit. One finds, like the anguished Luther, that one is accepted trotz one’s 
unacceptability. At the boundary between being and nonbeing, and far beyond all forms of 
theism which ever and again forget the ontological difference and figure the divine as a being, 
absolute faith fears no judgment and asks no forgiveness (ibid., 189-90). This is the paradox of 
Christianity, says Tillich: not irrational, nor absurd, nor reflectively or dialectically rational. The 
‘paradox’ is a new reality and not a logical riddle (Tillich 1967, 2: 91). 
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Notes 
 
1 Systematic Theology is cited by volume and page number. 
 
2 One could compare cultural analyses of Systematic Theology, volume I and Courage to Be with Simone Weil’s 
view of the human situation in The Need for Roots, or Cassirer’s in his late Essay on Man, or Arendt’s vision of 
human activity in the incomplete trilogy, The Life of the Mind. The contrast between the quality of thought and art 
evoked in ages of great suffering or political repression and that produced by the complacent civilizations of 
developed industrial ‘democracies’ driven by consumerism, technology, and endless entertainment is unsettling. Not 
the least unsettling is the way the intellectual’s insight is purchased at the cost of mass suffering. 
 
3 I am assuming with Kierkegaard, but without reciting his argument, that aestheticism or a culture of endless 
entertainment is a low-grade or unconscious form of despair (Kierkegaard, 1989).  Sean McGrath explores 
Schelling’s projection of a third or Johannine phase of Christianity in his 1831/32 Urfassung der Philosophie der 
Offenbarung, where earlier phases of dogmatic or subjective belief will be sublimated by the critical and 
revolutionary fire of modernity (Enlightenment) into a new form that integrates lived social experience with the love 
abstractly represented in bygone forms of Christian belief. McGrath sees the consumerism of late capitalist societies 
as an inversion of Schelling’s hope, with love and sharing replaced by self-improvement and accumulation 
(McGrath 2014, 69-78). 
 
4 Tillich’s early essays emphasized the dramatic tension (the inclusion in and self-separation from divine being) 
between human consciousness and God, while Systematic Theology speaks of the groundless divine nature as the 
impossibility of nonbeing overcoming being. The former approach is epitomized in the 1809 Philosophical 
Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, where a ‘fall’ (or self-separation) from the absolute precipitates 
a cleavage between spirit and nature, which humankind henceforth takes to be its habitat, while the latter expresses 
the culmination of the philosophy of identity, as expressed in the 1804 Würzburg System (see Vater 2014, 135-43).  
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A recently published fragment from the same time shows Schelling speaking of both time and human consciousness 
as effects of a fall or separation of the finite from the embrace of divine absoluteness—caused by the tendency of 
humanity to assume an attitude of complacency or self-sufficiency vis à vis the creative power (see Patrick Leistner 
2014, 208-210). Tillich quietly presumed that all Schelling’s texts express more or less the same view: self-
consciousness is God-positing (and self-separating); if there is some contradictory in the formulation, it is not the 
fault of philosophical or theological commentators, but of the self-sundering finite subject itself. 
 
5 Sämmtliche Werke is cited by volume number and page. 
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